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Favoritism and Corporate Law: The
Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in
the Hyundai Motor Case
Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung Hwan Lee, and Stephen M. Woodcock*

Abstract
Core legal principles of U.S. corporate law are often met with perplexity in foreign
jurisdictions – this is especially true when a particular principle remains controversial even in the
U.S. This Article takes the corporate opportunity doctrine and examines how it has been exported
to the civil law regime in Korea. Korean conglomerates such as Samsung Group and Hyundai
Motor Group have become major players in the global market, but corporate law and practice in
Korea have had a difficult time keeping up with the developments in the business sector. The
Hyundai Motor Case demonstrates an ambitious but ill-fated attempt at adoption of U.S.
corporate legal doctrine in Korea. This Article explains and analyzes the case and the new
codified corporate opportunity doctrine rule in the Korean Commercial Code from a comparative
perspective, and suggests that the dialogue surrounding the corporate opportunity doctrine in
Korean legal and business communities are oriented in the wrong direction and that the new rule
needs substantial refinement.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose you control one of the biggest corporations in the world as the
“controlling shareholder-manager.”1 As you approach retirement, a succession
plan becomes necessary, and you desire to pass control of the corporation to your
son. To do so, you must prove to your shareholders and managers that your son is
a capable and experienced leader and that he has the potential to be as successful
* Hwa-Jin Kim is a Professor of Law at Seoul National University, and William W. Cook
Global Law Professor at the University of Michigan Law School; Seung Hwan Lee, LL.B. magna
cum laude Seoul National University School of Law and Diploma (first in his class), Research and
Training Institute of the Korean Supreme Court, is an associate of Lee & Ko, Seoul, Korea; and
Stephen Woodcock, J.D. magna cum laude University of Michigan Law School, is an associate in
the Chicago office of Jenner & Block LLP.
1
The controlling shareholder-manager is one of the characteristics of the concentrated
ownership economy and family-controlled firms. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family
Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 Stanford Law Review
633 (2007); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating
the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harvard Law Review 1641 (2006).
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as you have been in running the business. Towards that end, you form a new small
firm, making 40 percent of the capital contribution yourself, with your son
contributing the remaining 60 percent. He will serve as the manager of the new
firm, and his success in this new role will prove his ability to take your position
and lead the corporation you control once you step down. The new firm engages
in the business of providing certain services necessary to your corporation and its
affiliated companies and you instruct your officers and employees to purchase
those services exclusively from your son's firm, sometimes for a price higher that
what could be bargained for at arm's length. Over a relatively short period of time,
the new firm grows into a public corporation and the relationship between your
companies strengthens, resulting in massive profits for you and your son. This is
the story of Hyundai Motor Company (“Hyundai Motor”) and the “new firm”
Hyundai Glovis Co., Ltd. (“Hyundai Glovis”), and we pose the following
question: Under the corporate legal regime as it is today, has a wrong been
committed, and if so, what was it and what legal principle has been violated?
More specifically, is it against the law to favor your son's firm through the
exercise of your managerial power?
Some activist shareholders of Hyundai Motor thought the CEO violated
the corporate opportunity doctrine and must be held liable – they brought a
shareholder derivative lawsuit against Hyundai Motor's chief executive. The
problem was that Korean law did not recognize the corporate opportunity doctrine
at that time.2 The doctrine was eventually written into the Korean Commercial
Code (“KCC”), though the court has struggled with interpreting the doctrine and
the language of the statute. The KCC has since been amended to adopt the
corporate opportunity doctrine as it has developed over the decades in the United
States, however the confusion surrounding the doctrine amongst legal
professionals and scholars in Korea has persisted. This is at least in part because
the corporate opportunity doctrine is regarded as one of the most difficult legal
principles in U.S. corporate law and remains open to regular reinterpretation and
criticism.3 This Article will explain and attempt to comparatively analyze the
Hyundai Motor case and the new KCC rule.4

2

For Korean business law in the English language see Hwa-Jin Kim ed., Korean Business
Law (Edward Elgar, 2012).
3

See Robert Clark, Corporate Law ch. 7 (1986); Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities
to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale Law Journal 277
(1998).
4

For Korea’s efforts in improvement of corporate governance see Bernard S. Black et al.,
Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International Competitiveness, 26
Journal of Corporation Law 537 (2001); Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward the “Best Practice” Model in a
Globalizing Market: Recent Developments in Korean Corporate Governance, 2 Journal of
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II.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE AND COURT’S RULING

A.

The Scheme and Background

The actions taken by Hyundai Motor's controlling shareholder-manager
have been a widespread practice in Korea during the past decade. Korean
conglomerates 5 commonly split off segments of their affiliates’ existing
businesses into a separate enterprise, or establish a new company to engage in a
closely related business, with the chairman’s family members acquiring the new
company’s shares at the time of the establishment or sometime thereafter. While it
must be pointed out that such transactions cannot, with any certainty, be lumped
together and presumed to all serve the same single purpose (especially
considering the limited publicly-available information), one can easily conclude
that these transactions, when combined with the so called “Funneling of
Business” to the newly established company (Mul-lyang-mol-a-ju-gi in the
Korean language), 6 7 are used to solve the succession problem many
Corporate Law Studies 345 (2002); Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict
Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 366
(2006).
5

Usually South Korean conglomerates are referred to as ‘Chaebol’ in Korean language.
They are typically global multinational companies owning numerous international enterprises
controlled by a chairman who has power over all the operations. Jung Dong Hyeon, “Korean
Chaebol in Transition”, China Report, Vol. 40 (3) (2004), pp. 299~303. See also Jeong Seo, Who
Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate Governance, 14 Cardozo Journal of
International & Comparative Law 21 (2006).
6

According to the report released by Korea Fair Trade Commission on August 30, 2012
regarding the current state of affairs on the transactions of goods and services between the affiliate
companies of conglomerates (“inter-affiliate transactions”), the percentage of inter-affiliate
transactions by conglomerates with a controlling head was 13.6%, which is 2.5% higher than that
of conglomerates without a controlling head (11.1%). Furthermore, companies with high
percentage of equity owned by affiliates, the chairman’s relatives and the second generations of
the chairman’s family are found to have a relatively high ratio of inter-affiliate transactions.
Especially, companies where the second generations of the chairman’s family own more than 50%
of company’s shares, the ratio of inter-affiliate transactions was as high as 56.3%.
7

People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Economic Reform Research Institute,
“Report on the Share Transaction of the Head’s Family Members of 38 Conglomerates” (April 6,
2006), p. 11. According to the report, ‘appropriation of corporate opportunity’ has been found in
nearly all conglomerates, and it has been widely used as a tool for illegal succession taking
advantage of loopholes in the KCC and the Korean tax act. The report has been updated four times
up to the end of 2012 since its first publication, and according to the last report (Economic Reform
Research Institute, “The Fifth Report on the Problematic Share Transaction of the Head’s Family
Members of Conglomerates”), there were 66 cases which were suspected to be an ‘appropriation
of corporate opportunity’. As a result, as of end of 2012, the increased amount of the wealth
chairmens’ family members possesses was up to approximately KRW 10 trillion 429.9 billion, and
its average earning rate was 1,256%.
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conglomerates face. This is not a new observation, nor have the transactions gone
unnoticed or unopposed; activist shareholders have been vocal critics of the
practice and an active public dialogue on the issue is ongoing.
Although many transactions have been accused by activist shareholders
of being veiled appropriations of corporate opportunities, as of today there are
relatively few cases in which suit has been filed and the court given the
opportunity to examine the transaction and apply corporation law. This can be
partially explained by Korea’s unique legal system and culture. 8 A more
fundamental explanation is (i) the lack of a specific and explicit regulation
regarding the corporate opportunity doctrine in Korea’s civil law system and (ii)
the fact that despite the existence of the corporate opportunity doctrine based on
the provisions on director’s duty of loyalty (KCC Article 382-39), there is not
enough precedent or other legal basis to convincingly apply the corporate
opportunity doctrine to inter-affiliate transactions. Despite this, one Korean court
recently took a remarkable step in that direction; below, we discuss the court’s
ruling in the Hyundai Motor Shareholder Derivative Suit (“Hyundai Motor Case”).
The Case and Court’s Ruling10

B.

The plaintiffs in the case against Hyundai Motor are the civic group
‘Solidarity for Economic Reform’ along with minority shareholders of Hyundai
Motor. The defendants are Chung Mongkoo, Hyundai Motor’s CEO and head of
Hyundai Motor Group, and Kim Dongjin, President of Hyundai Motor.
Hyundai Glovis is a company specializing in the distribution service
business, established to unify and combine Hyundai Motor Group’s distribution
services. At the time of Hyundai Glovis’s establishment, its shareholders were
Chung Mongkoo (40%) and his eldest son Chung Uiseon (60%). Hyundai Motor
Group’s affiliates, such as Hyundai Motor, Kia Motors Corporation, Hyundai
8

In Korea there is no discovery process like U.S. Furthermore, since the plaintiff has a
strict liability on burden of proof; burden for a legal action to the plaintiff is relatively high.
Moreover, attorneys do not have an economic incentive to file a lawsuit, as punitive damages are
not allowed in Korea and contingent fees, where attorney can receive fees in proportion to the
amount of a favorable judgment, are not widely used. In fact, 50 years have passed since the KCC
has adopted shareholder derivative suit, yet the total number of derivative suits filed is relatively
small, and most of the derivative suits that were filed were public interest lawsuits raised by civic
groups.
9

Article 382-3 (Duty of Loyalty by Directors) “Director shall perform their duties in good
faith for the interest of the company in accordance with Acts, subordinate statues, and the articles
of incorporation.”
10

Seoul Central District Court No. 2008 GaHab 47881, February 25, 2011.
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Mobis Co., Ltd. (“Hyundai Mobis”), and Hyundai Steel Company did business
with Hyundai Glovis in nearly all areas, including automobile, steel and
component delivery, leasing services for distribution equipment, domestic PDI
(Pre-delivery Inspection) work, T/P (Transporter) sector and other deliveryrelated services through business transfers or private contracts. As a result, the
aggregate financial payments between Hyundai Motor Group and Hyundai Glovis
reached KRW 568.9 billion between March 2001 and June 2004.11 During that
time, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (the “KFTC”) imposed a penalty
surcharge of KRW 4.7 billion on Hyundai Motor for illegally supporting Hyundai
Glovis. The KFTC levied the penalty on the grounds that Hyundai Motor Group
was providing excessive financial return to Hyundai Glovis by allotting most of
affiliate companies’ transportation needs to Hyundai Glovis on terms that were
not arms’ length, and noted that the business capabilities of the relatively new
Hyundai Glovis had not been tested or verified.12
Numerous issues were raised in the litigation. Among them, the plaintiffs
argued that the directors of Hyundai Motor usurped a corporate opportunity,
stating: “(i) Transportation or distribution services including transportation broker
service that Hyundai Glovis is engaged in, provides essential assistance to
Hyundai Motor Group’s affiliates. Hyundai Motor’s working group has for a long
time, been striving to establish an integrated distribution company through share
investments by Hyundai Motor Group and its affiliates. (ii) Therefore the
distribution service by Hyundai Glovis falls under the scope of business
opportunity for Hyundai Motor. (iii) It can be expected that Chung Mongkoo as a
controlling shareholder and CEO of Hyundai Motor would have gained enormous
benefits by acquiring shares of the integrated distribution company. Furthermore
Hyundai Motor’s distribution service is one of the most important sectors in the
company’s scope of business. Therefore, since Hyundai Motor could financially
afford to acquire major shares of Hyundai Glovis, such a plan should have been
reviewed and reported to the board of directors and measures should have been
taken, so that the board of directors could make a resolution for the acquisition of
the shares of Hyundai Glovis. (iv) Nevertheless, CEO Chung Mongkoo and his
son secretly acquired the shares of Hyundai Glovis, without any process of
reporting such agenda to the board of directors. (v) Such an act clearly constitutes
11

Afterwards, Jeong Mongkoo and Jeong Uiseon sold some of their shares to Wilhelmson,
a Norwegian shipping company and acquired approximately KRW 100 billion from the sale.
Hyundai Glovis was listed in the KOSPI stock market in January 2006 and accordingly Jeong
Mongkoo and Jeong Uiseon earned about KRW 400 billion of book valuation profit. People’s
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Economic Reform Research Institute, op. cit.
12

Hyundai Motor Group filed for a lawsuit for revocation of the KFTC’s disposition,
however lost in the lawsuit (Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2009 Du 15494, October 25, 2012).
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appropriation of Hyundai Motor’s corporate opportunity as CEO Chung Mongkoo
and his son Chung Uiseon privately gained benefits by depriving Hyundai Motor
of its business opportunity.”
At the time this judgment was rendered, the Amended KCC’s Article on
Prohibition against Appropriation of Company’s Opportunities and Assets
(discussed below) was not in effect.13 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that
the appropriation of a corporate opportunity could be derived from concepts
already existing in the pre-amendment KCC, the duty of good manager’s due care
or duty of loyalty, then defined the concept of appropriation of corporate
opportunity as “a principle that anyone such as the director or executive member
of the company who has duty of loyalty, shall not unfairly seize the company’s
opportunity for their own benefit, by using his status as a fiduciary and fiduciary
relations.” However, the court also ruled that the director is not obliged to actively
transfer all of its business opportunities to the company he or she is aware of,
since ‘business opportunity’ is a comprehensive and vague concept, and moreover
the duty of good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty is a duty during the
performance of duties, not a general duty to take every action potentially
beneficial to the company. Therefore, the court provided a narrow interpretation
that in determining that the director has damaged the company of its expectation
profits by violating duty of loyalty, the business opportunity should only be
restricted to “realistically existing specific business opportunities.” In other words,
(i) when the business opportunity of the company was an existing, realistic, and
specific opportunity, with specific discussions within the company on the
promotion of business or the company being proposed a business opportunity with
advantageous conditions and (ii) where there was substantial probability that the
company would have promoted its business based on such business opportunity in
accordance with the existing company’s reasonable business judgment based on
factors such as business strategy, business type, financial conditions, business
characteristics, investment size, burden of risk and expected income, then the
director shall have duty of good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty to cause the
company to promote such business. When the director has seized or usurped the
company’s business opportunity in such a circumstance then violation of duty of
good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty can be recognized.
The court ruled that, based on the considerations discussed below, there
was insufficient basis to prove that the segment entered by Hyundai Glovis was
Hyundai Motor’s existing, realistic and specific business opportunity, and
therefore CEO Chung Mongkoo did not have any duty of good manager’s due
13

The bill amending the relevant portion of the KCC was before Parliament at the time,
but had not yet been passed.
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care or duty of loyalty to offer Hyundai Motor the opportunity to subscribe to
Hyundai Glovis shares when it was established. Thus CEO Chung Mongkoo did
not unfairly seize or usurp the Hyundai Motor Group’s business opportunity. The
considerations behind the court’s decision were: (i) While Hyundai Glovis’s
distribution services were related to Hyundai Motor Group’s manufacture and
sales, an automobile company does not have to conduct its own distribution or
establish a subsidiary for its distribution – this is a business judgment decision and
thus whether to establish an internal business unit, establish a subsidiary or
outsource it to another company is fundamentally at the discretion of the
company’s business judgment; (ii) the decision to establish Hyundai Glovis
started with the desire to effectively manage distribution services of all the
Hyundai Motor Group’s affiliates, the direct trigger for which was CEO Chung
Mongkoo’s order; and (iii) employees of Hyundai Motor Group’s affiliates, not
just those of Hyundai Motor itself, worked to establish and advance Hyundai
Glovis, and Hyundai Glovis also serves Hyundai Motor Group’s affiliates,
including Kia Motors Corporation, Hyundai Mobis, and Hyundai Steel Company.
Although the court did not rule that CEO Chung Mongkoo had usurped
Hyundai Motor Group’s business opportunity, it did find that by unfairly raising
freight charges to be paid to Hyundai Glovis, a loss of approximately KRW 14.3
billion was caused to Hyundai Motor. Further, the KFTC imposed KRW 4.7
billion penalty for these illegal actions, resulting in a loss totaling KRW 19 billion
by Hyundai Motor. Taking the overall circumstance into consideration,14 CEO
Chung Mongkoo’s liability was limited to 90% of the loss (about KRW 17.1
billion).15 CEO Chung Mongkoo and the minority shareholders all waived their
right to appeal. The litigation concluded when Solidarity for Economic Reform
and CEO Chung Mongkoo mutually agreed that he would divest his interest in

14

The Korean Court rules that “when the director has liability for damages from violating
laws, decrees, regulations or articles of associations, neglecting duties, then the amount of
damages can be limited, according to the ideology of indemnification for damages, equity in
apportionment of damages, taking every circumstance into consideration, including but not limited
to content and nature of the business, how the director has violated due process, the form of
director’s violation of duties, objective circumstances or degree on company’s damages and
expansion, director’s contribution to the company, director’s profit from violation of duties, lack of
organizational system in the company or risk management. (Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2002
Da 60467, 60474, December 10, 2004, Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2003 Da 69638, October 28,
2005, Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2005 Da 34797, September 21, 2007, Supreme Court of Korea,
No. 2006 Da 33333, October 11, 2007, etc.)
15

In the above case, illegal supporting actions to Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd., Kia Motors
Corporation was also an issue, which is irrelevant to the subject of this article. When considering
these issues, the total amount of damages was up to KRW 185.8 billion, and as a result, the total
amount of damages CEO Jeong Mongkoo had to bear was KRW 82.6 billion.
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Hyundai Glovis within a reasonable period of time, with the aim of avoiding
any further controversy around the issue.16
THE NEW COMMERCIAL CODE

III.

Korea amended its Commercial Code (the “KCC” or the “Code”) as of
April 14, 2011. 17 The amendment inserted Article 397-2, which expressly
adopted the corporate opportunity doctrine. The newly inserted Article 397-2
reads as follows:18
KCC Article 397-2 (Prohibition against Appropriation of Company’s
Opportunities and Assets)
(1) No director shall use any business opportunity of the company
which corresponds to any of the following subparagraphs and
may be of present or future benefit to the company, for his/her
own account or for the account of a third party, without the
approval of the board of directors. In such cases, the approval of
the board of directors shall be granted with two thirds or more of
the total number of directors;
1.

A business opportunity which has become known to the
director in the course of performing his/her duty, or a
business opportunity taking advantage of information of the
company;

2.

A business opportunity closely related to the business
that is being currently conducted or is to be conducted by the
company;

16
After such a settlement had been reached, Jeong Mongkoo paid out or sold some of his
Shares in Hyundai Glovis as damages, donated some of the shares to Hyundai Motor Jeong
Mongkoo Foundation. As of now, Jeong Uiseon owns 31.88%, Jeong Mongkoo owns 11.51%,
Hyundai Motor owns 4.88%, Hyundai Motor Jeong Mongkoo Foundation owns 4.46% of Hyundai
Glovis’ shares.
17

The newly amended KCC came into effect on April 14, 2012.

18

Article 397-2 is very much like the U.S. American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (‘ALI principle’) and its relevant rules.
KCC, its case law and interpretation has developed in a way to incorporate laws regarding AngloAmerican liability of a director. The new insertion of Article 397-2 in the KCC could be seen as a
continuation of such tendency in KCC.

8
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(2) A director who has violated paragraph (1) and thereby incurred
damage to the company and the director who approved the same
shall be jointly and severally liable for compensation of the
damage; and the benefit earned by the director or a third party
from the violation shall be presumed to be the damage suffered
by the company.
The legislative process to adopt corporate opportunity doctrine
amendment was controversial.19 Some felt the legislation was superfluous, since
the appropriation of a corporate opportunity can be theoretically covered by
existing articles of the Code, particularly those related to a director’s duty of
loyalty, a director’s prohibition against competitive business (Article 397
paragraph 1) or a director’s prohibition against self-dealing transactions (Article
398), derived from Article 382-3, which regulates director’s duty of loyalty.20
Others argued that ambiguities in the new legislation could lead to excessive
lawsuits, discourage CEOs from pursuing innovative business opportunities and
have negative effects on social welfare.21 On the other hand, supporters the
legislation pointed to the practical difficulties of holding directors responsible
under a provision on the general duty of loyalty, and the fact that in Korea many
corporate opportunity appropriation cases are not based on directors’ prohibited
operation of competing businesses or self-dealing transactions. They argued that
an explicit provision for the corporate opportunity doctrine was necessary to

19

The newly inserted corporate opportunity doctrine was one of the three major issues for
the Ministry of Justice in the legislative process along with double derivative suits and executive
director legislation. As the issue was so significant for the Ministry of Justice, it was the subject of
a public debate in the Commercial Code Issue Mediation Committee. Koo Seungmo, “Legislative
Process in Corporate law of the Commercial Code and Tasks to be solved”, Advanced Commercial
Law review Serial Number 55 (2011. 7), Ministry of Justice, p. 115.
20

In the above Hyundai Motor Case, the court also acknowledged that the concept
‘appropriation of corporate opportunity’ could be derived from existing KCC’s concepts, duty of
good manager’s due care or duty of loyalty.
21

Legal professionals and scholars who are against the legislation are as follows. Choi
Junseon, “The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity”, Justice Vol. 95 (2006), Choi Wanjin,
“Articles : Critical Observation of the Commercial Law Draft Revision”, Business Administration
and Law Vol.17(2) (2007), , Kim Jeongho, “The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity”, Business
Administration and Law Vol.17(2) (2007), Jae Yeol Kwon, Paik Jeongung , Lee Seungcheol,
“2007 Winter Seminar : Papers ; Corporate Opportunity Doctrine - A Comparative Law Analysis
of a Compromise Reform Proposal on the Commercial Code -”, Commercial Law Review
Vol.25(4) (2007), Korea Listed Companies Association, “Review on the amended Commercial
Law”, (Member Lee Sangmin of the Assembly, submit the bill as a representative: Bill Number
3753).
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clarify the substantive and procedural applicability as well as liability for
violation.22
The Korean Ministry of Justice initially announced that the corporate
opportunity doctrine would be adopted only as a declaratory article, providing that
“No director shall use any business opportunity of the company that may be of
present or future benefit to the company, for his/her own account or for the
account of a third party.” However when submitted to the National Assembly, the
concept of a business opportunity was materialized and amended only in the case
of director’s appropriation of the business opportunity through engaging in selfdealing transactions. 23 During the course of the legislative process, some
members of the National Assembly argued that a powerful regulation by law was
necessary. Six amendments to the bill were proposed, including one that would
have expanded the range of applicability not only to directors but also to major
shareholders and related persons, adopting a right of intervention in appropriation
of corporate opportunity cases, which is acknowledged in the prohibition against a
director’s operation of competitive business (KCC Article 397 paragraph 2).24
Eventually, an agreement was reached to insert new Article 397-2 as stated above.
Such a complicated legislative history shows how sensitive the public opinion was
regarding the incorporation of the corporate opportunity doctrine into law. 25
However, it also reveals that consensus on the content or legal nature of the

22

Legal professionals and scholars who are for the legislation are as follows. Lim Jaeyeon,
“The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity”, Human Rights and Justice Vol. 363 (2006), Jeong
Woong Baik, “Articles : The U.S. Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and the Korea Commercial
Code- Focused on the case of Guth in Delaware: Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del, Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(Del, 1939)”, Commercial Law Review Vol.25(3) (2006), Kwon Sunhui, “Theoretical Review on
Commercial Law newly inserted Article 398-3(Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity)”, Commercial
Law Review Vol.26(3) (2007).
23

For appropriation of corporate opportunity that is not classified as self-dealing
transaction, Article 382-3 duty of loyalty by directors applies.
24

KCC Article 397 (1) No director shall, without the approval of the board of directors,
engage in for his/her own account or for the account of a third party any transaction in the same
line of business of the company or become an unlimited liability member or a director of any other
company, the business purposes of which are the same as those of the company. (2) If any director
has engaged in a transaction for his/her own account in contravention of paragraph (1), the
company and if he/she has made a transaction for the account of a third party, the company may
request the pertinent director to transfer any interest accrued therefrom. (3) Rights under paragraph
(2) shall be extinct upon the lapse of one year after the date such transaction has been made.
25

Chun Gyeonghun, “How to Interpret New Regulations on Appropriation of Corporate
Opportunity under the Recent Amendment to the Korean”, Corporate Private Law Review Vol. 30
Serial Number 2 (2011. 8), p. 145.

10
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corporate opportunity doctrine has not yet been clearly or consistently formed in
Korea.26
It must be noted that unlike the prohibition on the appropriation of
corporate opportunity theory in the U.S., Korea adopted its corporate opportunity
doctrine to regulate the conglomerates’ so called “Funneling of Business”.27 As
discussed above, major civic groups in Korea have continuously raised the issue
of the transfer of wealth to controlling shareholders and their related persons
through the so called “Funneling of Business” by conglomerates’ affiliates and
opposed such practice as a suspected case of the usurpation of corporate
opportunities. This likely influenced the adoption of Article 372-2. This is also
reflected in the Review Report by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee on the
proposed amendment of the KCC submitted to the National Assembly. The
Review Report points to the Hyundai Motor Case, stating that “[r]ecently a
number of representative directors or controlling shareholders have usurped
business opportunities to reinforce their control over the company or transfer their
management control. However it is difficult to regulate these transactions through
existing regulations such as duty of loyalty or prohibition against self-dealing
transactions by directors.” According to the Review Report, in order to regulate
these types of transactions, a provision incorporating the corporate opportunity
doctrine is needed.28
THE U.S. LAW

IV.

Because the origins of the corporate opportunity doctrine can be traced
back to case law developed under the United States legal regime, most scholars
would agree that a study of Korean Commercial Code Article 397-2 and the
concept of a “business opportunity” thereunder should begin with a survey of the
U.S. doctrine. This is especially true considering the Korean doctrine is
understood to have adopted the American Law Institute’s defining principles on
the corporate opportunity doctrine.29 Consequently, preceding our analysis of
26
Some scholars argue that, in Korea, there are only discussions about the “need” to
regulate director’s appropriation of corporate opportunity, although not even a consensus is
reached specifically on what corporate opportunity is, what kind of liability shall be charged
through which standards. Kim Hong-Ki, “Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and it`s Implication for
the Interpretation and Regulations in Korea”, Commercial Law Case Review Vol. 21(2) (2008.6.),
p. 101.
27

Kim Hwa-Jin, Corporate Finance and Governance, 2nd ed. (Seoul : PYBooks, 2012), p.

322.
28

The Legislation and Judiciary Committee, Commercial Act Proposed Amendment
(introduced by the Government) Review Report (Corporate law) (2008. 11), p. 150 et seq.
29

American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
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Korean Commercial Code Article 397-2, this section provides a look at the history
and formulation of the corporate opportunity doctrine in the United States. The
state of Delaware is the dominant jurisdiction for corporations in the United States,
and as such the focus is on the development of Delaware case law.
A.

History of the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the United States

The classic statement of the corporate opportunity doctrine is set forth in
Guth v. Loft,30 a case decided in 1939 by the Delaware Supreme Court (discussed
further below). The doctrine is a logical extension of the duty of loyalty, one of
the oldest and most basic fiduciary principles. The fiduciary duty of loyalty
states that one who undertakes to act on behalf of another must not place his own
interests ahead of the interests of his principal; a concept that can be traced back
more than eight centuries and is found in many of the earliest written codes of
law.31
While the duty of loyalty can be stated succinctly and is widely held to be
a foundational principle in many areas of law, applying the principle to a set of
facts has proven to often be complicated and controversial—this has been
especially true of the corporate opportunity doctrine. A reading of the opinions
in Guth and subsequent corporate opportunity cases show a judiciary that has
struggled to create a standard for the straightforward application of doctrine to
facts, and in the process has created a complex body of tests, factors and case law
precedent. Before exploring the path the doctrine has taken through judicial
inquiry and analysis over the past 70 years, it is helpful to understand its basic
framework; the simplified illustration below shows the basic steps in determining
whether taking a business opportunity may constitute a breach of the corporate
opportunity doctrine under U.S. law:

Recommendations, Section 5.05(b).
30

5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939).

31

See, e.g., Hammurabi’s Code of Laws; The Great Qing Code
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B.

The Evolution of Case Law

Application of the corporate opportunity doctrine in Delaware generally
begins with a statement of the doctrine from Guth v. Loft. In Guth, the president
and director of Loft Incorporated (a candy, syrup and foods manufacturer)
acquired a controlling interest in the Pepsi-Cola Corporation and began secretly
using the resources of Loft to support Pepsi’s operations. Loft sued Guth,
alleging that Guth had an obligation, as the president and a director) to offer the
opportunity to acquire the interest in Pepsi to Loft. The court found in favor of
Loft, and the Delaware Supreme Court has since stated:
The rule of the Guth case is that when there is presented to a
corporate officer a business opportunity which the
corporation is financially able to undertake, and which, by
its nature, falls into the line of the corporation’s business and
is of practical advantage to it, or is an opportunity in which
the corporation has an actual or expectant interest
[(respectively, the “line of business” test and the “interest or
expectancy” test)], the officer is prohibited from permitting
his self-interest to be brought into conflict with the
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corporation’s interest and may not take the opportunity for
himself.32
The court also observed that the prohibition against corporate officers and
directors using their position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests is essentially public policy; it is derived from a profound knowledge of
human characteristics and is merely one of the manifestations of the general
duties of loyalty and good faith.33 The court foresaw the application problems
that would arise in the following decades as the judiciary struggled to apply the
Guth rule and to adapt it to factual scenarios, stating “[t]he occasions for the
determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and
no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by
no fixed scale.”34
Johnston v. Greene came before the Delaware Supreme Court 17 years
later, and presented a more complex set of facts.35 The director who was offered
the opportunity was involved in the management of many similar businesses (each
of which plausibly had an interest in the offer), and received the offer in his
individual capacity rather than as a director of any corporation (the offeror was
not aware of his affiliations). Furthermore, the Court found that the key
corporation in question had no well-defined “line of business.” Though the court
stated it was applying the Guth rule it focused almost exclusively on the line-ofbusiness test, and found the fact that the director received the offer in his personal
capacity to be highly relevant. The court held that where an officer receives an
offer in his individual capacity, a much stricter standard should be applied to
determine if the opportunity is one to which the corporation is entitled.
Essentially, in such a scenario the opportunity must be shown to be vital to the
corporation or one to which it has a specific interest or expectancy. The court
also repeatedly referenced “fairness” in the analysis, stating that “whether an
opportunity is corporate or personal depends on the facts—upon the existence of
special circumstances that would make it unfair for the director or officer to take
the opportunity for himself.36 Johnston presents an especially difficult question
for the line-of-business test, as a finding that the director took a corporate
opportunity raises the challenge of determining which of the corporations the

32

Equity Corp. v. Milton, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (Del. 1966).

33

Supra, 5 A.2d 503, 510.

34

Id.

35

Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956).

36

Id., at 924.
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opportunity would belong to—likely pushing the court to employ a fact-based
fairness analysis.
In 1971, the Delaware Supreme Court identified two additional factors in
Kaplan v. Fenton that it found relevant in affirming the Delaware circuit court’s
holding that a director had not usurped a corporate opportunity.37 In Kaplan, the
director purchased shares in a corporation for his own account, but only after (i) a
similar offer was rejected by the board of the corporation months before and (ii)
the director disclosed the second offer to the CEO of the corporation and asked
him if it should be presented to the entire board (the CEO said that it should not).
In the opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court found both of these events to be
relevant to their analysis and to their findings that (i) the offer was not one in
which the corporation has an interest (as it had been expressly disclaimed), (ii) it
was not an opportunity that was essential to the Corporation and (iii) it was not
one in which the corporation’s resources had been improperly put to use.
Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court in 1980, demonstrates the ongoing struggle in the
application of the corporate opportunity doctrine, now interpreting the Guth and
Johnston standard as a straightforward three-prong analysis: “[An] officer may
not seize the opportunity for his own if: (a) the corporation is financially able to
undertake it; (b) it is within the corporation’s line of business; (c) the corporation
is interested in the opportunity.38 Furthermore, the facts in Science Accessories
caused the court to consider the doctrine alongside a competing public interest,
the “policy recognized by the courts . . . of safeguarding society’s interest in
fostering free and vigorous competition in the economic sphere.”39 The court,
citing the Restatement of Torts, concluded that “while an agent may not put
himself in a position antagonistic to his principal, an agent is not thereby
prevented from acting in good faith outside his employment even though it may
adversely affect his principal’s business,” and further may “make arrangements or
plans to go into competition with his principal before terminating his agency,
provided no unfair acts are committed or injury done his principal.”40
Broz v. Cellular Information Systems later incorporated this balancing
consideration into the corporate opportunity doctrine test by adding a fourth
prong: Does an officer or director create a conflict between his self-interest and
37

Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971).

38

Science Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 1980).

39

Id.

40

Id., at 962, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387, Comments b and e (1957).
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the interests of the corporation by taking the opportunity for himself?41 Again
however, applying Broz in a later case, the court has emphasized that “no single
factor is dispositive . . . [i]nstead the Court must balance all factors as they apply
to a particular case.” 42 Broz is also important for its consideration of the
requirement that an opportunity be presented to the board before it is usurped
(discussed further below).
C.

Presentment of Opportunity to the Corporation as a Safe Harbor

In Broz, Robert Broz was a director of Cellular Information Systems
(CIS) and also the sole shareholder of RFB Cellular. The suit was brought when
RFB Cellular purchased a cellular license over a bid (presented to Broz in his
capacity as the owner of RFB) by Price Cellular, a company that was
simultaneously attempting to acquire CIS. Price Cellular brought suit in the
name of CIS, alleging that Broz usurped a corporate opportunity of CIS and that
he had a duty to Price Cellular since they were trying to acquire CIS. Broz
argued that his duty was only to CIS, and that CIS was unable to purchase the
license because it was undergoing a Chapter 11 reorganization and selling the
cellular licenses it did have. Broz did not take steps to hide the transaction from
CIS and discussed the opportunity with a number of CIS officers and directors
individually. He took the position that formal presentation of the opportunity to
the board was unnecessary since the company was in no position financially to
take advantage of the opportunity (among other reasons). Although the
Delaware Chancery Court held that Broz had usurped an opportunity rightfully
belonging to CIS, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the decision, holding
that no single factor is dispositive and formal presentment to the board is not
strictly necessary.43 The court went on to state, however, that where a director or
officer does take the step of formal presentment, he may enjoy the protection of a
safe harbor and will be free from the danger of later being found to have usurped
an opportunity since the board has disclaimed it.
Cases following Broz have reaffirmed the safe harbor, holding that where
the corporation had a clear interest in the opportunity, a director or officer who
chooses not to formally present the opportunity to the board “acts at his peril,
unless he is ultimately able to demonstrate post hoc that the corporation was not
deprived of an opportunity in which it had an interest in or capability of

41

Broz v. Cellular Info Sys. 673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1996).

42

Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 972
(Del.Ch.2003).
43

Supra, at note 39, 158.
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engaging.”44 In Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, the court held that the safe harbor
applied only where the opportunity was presented to the board of directors; where
a director presented an opportunity to an officer of the corporation (in this case,
the CEO) who considered and rejected the offer, the protections of the safe harbor
were not available because approving or rejecting a corporate opportunity is a
decision that correctly lies with the corporation’s board of directors.45
V.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A.

Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and the “Funneling of Business”

As discussed above, KCC Article 397-2 is recognized as a tool to regulate
the so-called “Funneling of Business,” which is often used to increase or transfer
the wealth of controlling shareholder-managers. However, there are fundamental
doubts about whether the corporate opportunity doctrine applies to the “Funneling
of Business.” Whether a company transfers its existing business activities to a
third party, or consigns its necessary existing business (or changes its consignee to
another party) is at the discretion of the company (i.e., it is a choice of ‘allocation
of business activities’). 46 Therefore it is difficult to consider “Funneling of
Business” as a new corporate opportunity. A corporate opportunity should be
distinguishable from the company’s existing business. The “Funneling of
Business” is not so much a matter of corporate opportunity, as it is a choice
between internalizing or outsourcing its existing business; when outsourced, the
question is how and to whom to outsource. In other words, while possibly
considered as a corporate opportunity for the company receiving the business,
outsourcing part of an existing business cannot be seen as a corporate opportunity,
since an opportunity created by the company’s active conduct using its existing
business is not deemed to be a corporate opportunity.47
Hyundai Motor has been outsourcing its non-core businesses, including
distribution, since well before Hyundai Glovis was established. The distribution
44

Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 n. 7 (Del. 1996).

45

Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 263 (Del. 2002).

46

Stephen J. Choi/Eric L. Talley, “Playing Favorites with Shareholders,” 75 Southern
California Law Review 271(2002), pp. 305~307.
47

According to U.S. Law, appropriation of corporate opportunity is limited to
opportunities from outside, that is opportunities created by a third parties or that arise from the
company’s existing business. It is not an opportunity created by the company’s active conduct
using its existing business. However, since the KCC Article 397-2 has a broad definition on
corporate opportunity, there is a strong argument that in Korea, Article 397-2 can be applied to the
so called “Funneling of Business” in the Hyundai Motor Case. Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 200,
Koo Seungmo, op. cit., p. 125.
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business was previously outsourced to Dongsuh Dynasty Co. Ltd. and SungWoo
Corporation. The efficiency and customer service issues that characterized those
business arrangements led the management of Hyundai Motor to conclude that it
was necessary to establish an affiliate specializing in distribution, and Hyundai
Glovis was born. The initial decision to outsource Hyundai Motor’s distribution
needs to a non-affiliated company is a typical business decision falling under the
business judgment rule.48 Furthermore, the business judgment rule also applies to
the decision to internalize a function, or establish an affiliate to meet business
needs. In the Hyundai Motor Case, no questions were raised about the outsourcing
of distribution to other companies before the establishment of Hyundai Glovis.
However, civic groups and shareholders vocalized series concerns when Hyundai
Motor began to direct that business to a firm controlled by the chairman and his
son.49 Thus, the point of contention regarding the “Funneling of Business” in
Korea is not on the funneling itself, but to whom the business is funneled and
whether it is done on terms that are fair and negotiated at arm’s length.
As discussed above, the company’s existing business and the
opportunities related to it could be opportunities for a third party, but it is not an
“corporate opportunity” for the company. Therefore it is fundamentally not an
issue of corporate opportunity. In Korea, cases that are scrutinized as potential
“Funneling of Business” cases mostly involve, (i) issues on scope of applicability
of the prohibition on self-dealing transactions from the perspective of corporate
law, 50 (ii) issues regarding the wealth acquired by controlling shareholders
through “Funneling of Business” from the perspective of tax law, (iii) illegal
supporting actions from the perspective of the anti-trust law. Thus it is appropriate
to resolve these issues under those applicable laws. The KCC, as amended as of
April 14, 2011, tightened its regulations on self-dealing transactions (KCC Article
39851). Not only are transactions between a director and the Company regulated,
48
The above reviewed Hyundai Motor Case (Seoul Central District Court No. 2008
GaHab 47881, February 25, 2011) clearly points out these points.
49

People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy Economic Reform Research Institute,
op. cit.. Such arguments seem to be even clearer since, according to the Report, nearly all of the
cases that are doubtful to have usurped corporate opportunity are almost, without exception, cases
regarding mega transactions of a company’s existing business part between a company and a
company where controlling shareholders’ families have significant shares.
50

The regulation of self-dealing transactions emphasizes ‘fairness”, while the regulation
of appropriation of corporate opportunity emphasizes ‘disclosure’. E. G. Orlinsky & G. J. Benoit,
The Treacherous State of Director and Officer Conflicts of Interest, 37 Maryland Bar Journal 36,
38 (2004).
51
KCC Article 398 (Transactions between Directors, etc. and Company): When a person
falling under any of the following subparagraphs intends to engage in a transaction with the
company for his/her own account or for the account of a third party, he/she shall in advance
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but transactions between the Company and its major shareholders, their spouses
or relatives and affiliated companies within a certain range are also regulated.
According to the amended Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, for corporations
whose total turnover to a specially related corporation (the “Beneficiary
Corporation”) is more than 30% of all its turnover, the controlling shareholders
and their spouse and relatives (having more than 3% of company’s shares) are
presumed to reap the company’s business profits as their own,52 and gift tax is
imposed on these profits (Korean Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act Article 45-3
and its Enforcement Decree 34-2). The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
prohibits “Assisting a specially related person or companies by providing
advanced payment, loans, manpower, immovable assets, securities, goods,
services, right on intangible properties, etc. at significantly higher or lower rates
and thus providing excessive economic benefit” and imposes regulatory measures
such as penalty surcharges, corrective measures and criminal punishment
(Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act Article 23 paragraph 1 subparagraph 7,
Article 24, Article 24-2, Article 68 subparagraph 2 and its Enforcement Decree
attached Table 1-2).
In conclusion, “Funneling of Business” is fundamentally not related to
appropriation of corporate opportunity; insofar as the legislative intention behind
KCC Article 397-2 was to address the funneling problem, it has been flawed from
its inception.
B.

Drawbacks within the KCC 397-2

disclose material facts of the relevant transaction at the board of directors and shall obtain
approval therefrom. In such cases, the approval of the board of directors shall be granted with two
thirds or more of the total number of the directors, and the relevant transaction shall be fair in
terms of its particulars and procedures: 1. A director or a major shareholder under Article 5428(2)6; 2. The spouse and lineal ascendants or descendants of a person falling under subparagraph
1; 3. Lineal ascendants or descendants of the spouse of a person falling under subparagraph 1; 4. A
company in which a half or more of the total number of issued and outstanding shares with voting
rights is held by a person falling under any of subparagraph 1 through 3, solely or jointly with
others, or its subsidiary company; 5. A company in which a half or more of the total number of
issued and outstanding shares with voting rights is held by a person falling under any of
subparagraph 1 through 3, together with a company falling under subparagraph 4.
52

Gift Tax presumption is calculated as follows: after-tax business profit of Beneficiary
Corporation X (Transaction rate with specially related corporation – 30%) X (percentage of share
ownership – 3%).

19

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

19

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 79 [2013]

Apart from the issue of whether the new Code provision should apply to
the fact pattern in the Hyundai Motor Case, the doctrine as adopted has inherent
drawbacks, which we discuss below.53
1. The Ambiguity of the Meaning of ‘Corporate Opportunity’
KCC Article 397-2 (Prohibition against Appropriation of Company’s
Opportunities and Assets) specifies business opportunities that directors are
prohibited from usurping as follows: “A business opportunity which has become
known to the director in the course of performing his/her duty, or a business
opportunity taking advantage of information of the company (subparagraph 1)”
and “A business opportunity closely related to the business that is being currently
conducted or is to be conducted by the company (subparagraph 2).” Such business
opportunities, at the same time, must have “present or future benefit to the
company.” However it is difficult to determine whether a certain transaction falls
under the scope of the “corporate opportunity” concept, since the article uses
abstract terms such as “business opportunity”, “future benefit to the company”,
“business that to be conducted by the company”, “closely related to” and “taking
advantage of”.54 One year after adoption, there are still not enough precedents or
sufficient academic analysis on the corporate opportunity doctrine’s specific
meaning and requirements under the Code. Therefore, while discussions in U.S.
must be looked to, the problem is that even in U.S., where corporate opportunity
doctrine has been developed for the last 100 years, no precise definition has been
truly settled on. Indeed, leading corporate law scholars in the U.S. continue to
wrestle with the imprecise nature of the doctrine, even with the benefit of decades
of analysis and case law.55
In Korea, theoretical attempts to specify business opportunities that
cannot be usurped are based on principles of U.S. case law.56 Most U.S. cases
that recognized a director’s liability based on his appropriation of corporate
opportunity are either (1) self-dealing transactions in a vertical relationship: where
53

Sketched originally in B. S. Moon & Kim Hwa-Jin Kim, “Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine in the Draft New Commercial Code,” Corporate Governance Review Vol. 30 (2007),
pp.15~35, 30~33; Kim, Hwa-Jin, op cit, pp. 326~329.
54

Of course, subparagraph 1 seems to be clearer in a way that it can be read as information
obtained at company’s costs. However, subparagraph 2 “closely related to the business” is a very
vague concept.
55

See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Rethinking Delaware’s Corporate Opportunity Doctrine,
Research Paper No. 08-17, UCLA School of Law - Law & Economics Research Paper Series
(2008).
56

Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., pp. 162~182.
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there is a (material supply, purchase, sale, etc.) transaction between the director
and the company, when the director usurps the corporate opportunity (such as the
Guth case, discussed above), (2) competitive business (horizontal relationship)
scenarios: where a director’s business is in competition with the company’s
business (such as the Broz case, discussed above). Accordingly, it is difficult to
apply the doctrine to a business opportunity without a vertical or horizontal
relationship, even in a broad sense. (Theory A). On the other hand, some argue
that the standard applied by the Korean Supreme Court in the Hyundai Motor
Case, restricting the scope of business opportunity to “realistically existing
specific business opportunities”, is reasonable, because it relieves businesses’
anxiety over the unsettled standard and achieved legal stability, at least until a
clear application of the KCC Article 397-2 is established (Theory B).57
Theory A is useful in the sense that it implies that appropriations of
corporate opportunity mainly exist where there is a “close relationship” to the
business of a corporation because of a “competitive business relationship” or
“self-dealing relationship”.58 Nevertheless, it still does not clearly define any
standards on what a corporate opportunity is.59 Theory B is criticized on the basis
that there are no grounds to restrict business opportunity to “realistically existing
specific business opportunities” anymore, after the newly amended KCC came
into effect. The standard the Korean Supreme Court applied in the Hyundai Motor
Case was only reasonable since at the time of the judgment there was no explicit
article regarding corporate opportunity, so that business opportunity could only be
derived from director’s duty of loyalty.60

57
Choi Junsun, “Commentary on the amended Corporate Law 2011” (2011), pp. 128~129,
Shin Heungcheol, “Main Contents of the amended Commercial Code and Business Actions
Seminar Sourcebook”, Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, p. 16, Park Sun Jong,
“Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity under the Revised Commercial Code”, Han Yang Law
Vol. 22(2) (2011), p. 255.
58
However, the above theory raises the question whether, even without the new Article on
corporate opportunity, the same result could have been achieved by supplementing KCC Article
397 Prohibition against Competition or Article 398 Self-Dealing Transaction.
59

Even according to the theory, since KCC Article 397-2 defines “corporate opportunity”
very comprehensively, there are rarely cases where corporate opportunity may not be found under
Article 397-2. Furthermore, it is the aim of the amended KCC not to block any attempt to apply
Article 397-2 due to the comprehensive non-formal nature of corporate opportunity itself.
Applying Article 397-2 in individual cases is a separate question, though.
60

Koo Seungmo, op. cit., p. 125, Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 181, Lee Eonju, “Main
Contents of the amended Commercial Code and Business Actions Seminar Discussion Paper”,
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2011. 5. 26.), p.3.
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Therefore, as there is no distinct standard under the law (or accepted
theories or case law on the question) as to what constitutes a “corporate
opportunity”, there is concern that the court could arbitrarily apply the corporate
opportunity doctrine.61 Furthermore, such an ambiguity may not only prevent
Article 397-2 from functioning as a standard norm for future action, but also
induce risk aversion,62 impose unnecessary burdens on companies, and repress
entrepreneurial spirit. The theory of corporate opportunity has the competitive
benefit of preventing appropriation of corporate opportunities by directors or
fiduciaries, but by the same token has the drawback of potentially interfering with
the establishment of new businesses. 63 A balanced solution is required that
accounts for both impacts of the doctrine. This is a difficult and nuanced question;
indeed, in the U.S. the courts wrestled with this issue in the 1980’s in Science
Accessories and Broz, recognizing that public policy interests in allowing free
competition. U.S. law employs fiduciary principles to deal with the issue by
allowing agents to plan and develop new enterprises while in the employ of
another, so long as the agent acts in good faith and such undertakings do not put
the agent in a position antagonistic to his principal. As discussed above, the Broz
case incorporated this issue into its corporate opportunity doctrine elements,

61

Kim Hwa-Jin, op. cit., p.327.

62

According to KCC Article 400 paragraph 2, “A company may, in accordance with its
articles of incorporation, absolve the liability of a director under Article 399 with respect to the
amount exceeding six times (in cases of outside directors, three times) his/her remuneration
(including bonuses and the profit from exercise of stock option) for the latest on year prior to the
date of the act or misconduct of the director.”, however liability of a director is strictly regulated
since according to the KCC Article 397-2, the liability of a director cannot be absolved,
furthermore according to KCC Article 397-2 paragraph 2, “the benefit eared by the director or a
third party from the violation shall be presumed to be the damage suffered by the company” (Since
it is presumed (not deemed), there is still a chance to disprove the fact. Nevertheless the director
has to prove that the company would have had less profit if it had such an opportunity, and that is
very hard to prove for the director). Moreover, according to the Korean Criminal Act Article 355,
356, “A person administering another’s business, obtains pecuniary advantage or causes a third
person to do so from another in violation of ones duty, thereby causing loss to such person, shall
be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years or by a fine not exceeding thirty million
won.”, and the Supreme Court of Korea broadly interprets “in violation of ones duty” as
“including any act that loses trust to a person, from not acting in trust and good faith, which is
expected to be done or not to be done, according to the relevant contents, nature, detailed
circumstances of the business.” (Supreme Court of Korea, No. 94 Do 902, September 9, 1994)
Therefore directors should consider the danger of a criminal penalty resulting from the
appropriation of a corporate opportunity. There are discussions in Korea against punishing a
director for crime of misappropriation. See Lee Jongsang, “A Critical Review on liability of
director and crime of misappropriation”, Business Finance Law Vol. 19. (2006. 9), pp. 44~64.
63

Choi Junsun, op. cit., p. 124.
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considering whether the agent’s actions create a conflict with the interests of his
principle.64
2. The Meaning of “director who approved” According to KCC
Article 397-3 paragraph 2
The KCC Article 397-2 paragraph 2 states that “A director who has
violated paragraph (1) and thereby incurred damage to the company and the
director who approved the same shall be jointly and severally liable for
compensation of the damage”, and since paragraph 1 states that “in order to use
any business opportunity of the company, an approval of the board of directors
(by two thirds or more of the total number of directors) is required”, it seems to be
clear that “a director who has violated paragraph (1)” is a director that usurped
corporate opportunity without the approval of the board of directors. But who is
“director who approved” referring to? If there was approval of the directors, then
it would mean that at least there was no breach of paragraph (1); the provisions do
not seem to be coherently integrated. There are two main interpretations of the
contradicting provisions: (i) the first is that the above phrase only applies to
directors whose approval has violated their duty of good manager’s due care, and
as a result approved the appropriation of corporate opportunity (Theory I);65 and
(ii) the second is that the “director who approved” refers to a director who gave a
personal or de facto approval (which abets, aids, or supports) with a knowledge of
the appropriation of corporate opportunity and without the formal approval of the
board of directors (Theory II).66
Both theories do not entirely resolve the contradiction of KCC Article
397-2 paragraph 2. According to Theory I, directors whose approval had violated
their duty of good manager’s due care could be regulated by the violation of their
duty of good manager’s due care itself, so that there is not really a need to provide
an independent Article 397-2. Furthermore it is unreasonable that a director who
actively usurped corporate opportunity and a director who only approved the
process face the same liability. According to Theory II, it doesn’t seem to be
abnormal to interpret the “approval” in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 differently.
64

Supra, n. 39.

65

Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 205, Chang Jaeyeong/ Jung Junhyeok, “Prohibition of
Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity according to the amended KCC”, Business Finance Law
Vol. 51. (2012), p. 52.
66

Ko Changhyeon, “Main Contents of the amended Commercial Code and Business
Actions Seminar Discussion Paper”, Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2011. 5. 26.), p.2,
Kim Heecheol, “An Analysis of the Newly Enacted "Restriction of usurping corporate opportunity
and assets" in the KCC”, Judicial Officers, Vol. 660 (2011), p. 217.
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Furthermore, if a director has usurped a corporate opportunity without the
approval of the board of directors, then the director has violated KCC Article 3972 paragraph 1 and directors who detected such an act must report it to the
company and ask for corrective measures according to their inspection 67 or
reporting obligations.68
The legislative intent is known to be driven by a motivation more closely
related Theory I,69 and Theory I is reasonable according to a textual interpretation.
However, it nonetheless seems that KCC Article 397-2 paragraph 2 “director who
approved” ought to be deleted, and directors who did not usurp a corporate
opportunity to be liable only for violating their duty of good manager’s due care.70
3. Liability of Approving Directors
Where a director pursues a corporate opportunity in the manner
contemplated in Article 397-2 (the opportunity is reported to and approved by the
board of directors) and the other directors approve the pursuit in violation of
their duty of good manager’s due care, it is counterintuitive for such a director did
to face liability for his actions. According to the U.S. Model Business Corporation
Act § 8.70. Business Opportunities, “(a) A director’s taking advantage, directly
or indirectly, of a business opportunity may not be the subject of equitable relief,
or give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions against the director, in a
67

According to the court, a director of a corporation not only has to approve or disapprove
the agenda introduced in the board of directors, but is also obliged to inspect the overall business,
including his/her business, other active director’s business. Even a part-time director has such
obligations (Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2005 Da 51471, December 11, 2008). “Inspection
obligations could be different according to company’s size, organization, business type,
regulations, business conditions and financial standings, and in a highly divided and specialized
company, it could be inevitable that a joint representative director and active director has its own
specialized area to handle, but such circumstances cannot exempt directors from their inspection
obligations, and in such a case each director of the board of directors has liability to construct
reasonable information, reporting system and internal control system, and when there was not such
an effort or when directors intentionally disregarded company’s inspection or supervision although
there was such a system, and as a result did not know the danger that directors had to care about
including illegal improper business, then directors cannot escape from their liability for a reason
that that they did not know the illegal or improper act of other directors, and if damages occur
from continuous organizational carelessness of inspection, directors have liability for these
damages occurred from other directors or officers.” (Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2006 Da 68636,
September 11, 2008).
68
KCC 412-2 (Director’s Duty of Reporting) If a director finds any fact that is likely to
inflict a substantial loss on the company, he/she shall immediately report such to its auditors.
69

Koo Seungmo, op. cit., p. 127.

70

Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 205, Chang Jaeyeong/ Jung Junhyeok, op. cit., p. 52.
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proceeding by or in the right of the corporation on the ground that such
opportunity should have first been offered to the corporation, if before becoming
legally obligated respecting the opportunity the director brings it to the attention
of the corporation and: (1) action by qualified directors disclaiming the
corporation’s interest in the opportunity is taken in compliance with the
procedures set forth in section 8.62, as if the decision being made concerned a
director’s conflicting interest transaction, or (2) shareholders’ action disclaiming
the corporation’s interest in the opportunity is taken in compliance with the
procedures set forth in section 8.63, as if the decision being made concerned a
director’s conflicting interest transaction; except that, rather than making
‘‘required disclosure’’ as defined in section 8.60, in each case the director shall
have made prior disclosure to those acting on behalf of the corporation of all
material facts concerning the business opportunity that are then known to the
director. (b) In any proceeding seeking equitable relief or other remedies based
upon an alleged improper taking advantage of a business opportunity by a director,
the fact that the director did not employ the procedure described in subsection (a)
before taking advantage of the opportunity shall not create an inference that the
opportunity should have been first presented to the corporation or alter the burden
of proof otherwise applicable to establish that the director breached a duty to the
corporation in the circumstances.” Nevertheless, many Korean scholars still argue
that when the approval of other directors71 violates the duty of good manager’s
due care, then the act usurping corporate opportunity itself is considered illegal,
and the director who personally acted illegally shall be jointly and severally liable
for the damage, since such compensation is based on post-benefit correction.72
It stands to reason that such a result is rather excessive where a director
has reported the corporate opportunity to the company, has provided sufficient
information for the board to determine whether to take the opportunity and has not
exert any improper influence on other directors. Where there is potential liability
that can arise despite a person’s adherence to protocol, incentives to pursue or
participate in a new business for directors will decrease, leaving only negative
effects of the prohibition on appropriation of corporate opportunities. In other
words, in practice, most of the business opportunities that may fall under scrutiny
71

KCC Article 391 paragraph 3, Article 368 paragraph 4 states that “no person who has
special interest in a resolution by a meeting of board of directors shall exercise his/her voting
rights thereupon.” Therefore, a director who is willing to use corporate opportunity shall not
exercise his/her voting rights by a meeting of board of directors for approving appropriation of
corporate opportunity.
72

Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 200, Choi Junseon, op. cit., p. 126~127, Lee Cheolsong,
2011 Commentary on amended KCC (Seoul : PYBooks, 2012), p. 154, Jung Chanhyeong,
“Contents and Assignments for 2011 amended Corporate Law”, Seoul Bar Association/Korean
Legal Center cohosted Symposium Questions about 2011 amended Corporate Law, p. 30.
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will arise from the apt relationships and undertakings of the manager, and unless
the law provides a safe harbor for the director, strict scrutiny is being imposed on
director’s entrepreneurial activities while failed business establishment (action of
the board of directors) is being overlooked. 73 The focus of the corporate
opportunity doctrine should be on the due process of law (regulating scope of
providing information, contents of information and independence in the approval
process by the board of directors).
4. Quorum for Resolution by Board of Directors
KCC Article 397-2 requires two thirds of the board of directors74 to
approve the taking of a corporate opportunity. The quorum requirement is stricter
than the general quorum requirement under the KCC which requires a majority of
the directors to be present at the meeting, and the affirmative votes of a simple
majority of those present.75 The stricter quorum is specially applied to resolutions
approving self-dealing transactions and appropriations of corporate opportunities
under the amended KCC. Such rules are uncommon elsewhere in the world, and
there is no persuasive reason for increasing quorum for such resolutions only for
the above two cases. In the U.S., a director or officer seeking to take an
opportunity that may belong to the corporation does not require even a formal
presentment to the board of directors;76 if such a presentation is made, the board
may vote on the matter but there is no special quorum requirement. The reasoning
for requiring approval by the board of directors in corporate opportunity cases is
to ensure the company is aware of the potentially beneficial opportunity so that it
can decide whether to forego or pursue the opportunity –this is accomplished
without the stricter quorum and approval requirements.77
Interestingly, where the board considers a resolution to override the
prohibition against a director’s ability to compete with the company (Article 397
paragraph 1), the general quorum for resolution by the board of directors is
73

Kim Hwa-Jin, op. cit., p.326-327.

74

When counting the total number of directors, directors who are willing to use corporate
opportunity is excluded. As discussed above, such directors have special interest in a resolution by
a meeting of the board of directors, so that such director shall not exercise his/her voting rights
thereupon.
75

KCC Article 391 paragraph 1, “A resolution of the board of directors shall be adopted in
the presence of a majority of directors in office by the affirmative votes of a majority of directors
present at the meeting: Provided, that the voting requirement may be increased by the articles of
incorporation.”
76

Supra, n. 41.

77

Park Sun Jong, op. cit., p. 250.

26

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/79

26

Kim et al.:

applied according to KCC 391 paragraph 1 (the majority of board must be present
at the meeting and the affirmative votes of a majority of directors present must be
obtained). However, operation of a competing business is much more likely to
directly endanger the present existing business of the company, and a powerful
right of intervention is adopted in case of the violation of the prohibition against
competitive business, so that stricter liability is imposed compared to
appropriation of corporate opportunity. Therefore, it is unbalanced to increase the
quorum for a resolution by the board in the case of an appropriation of a corporate
opportunity.78 Furthermore, the increased affirmative vote requirement has the de
facto effect of preventing any operating committees within the board of directors79
from approving the resolution, often preventing rapid decision making.80
5. Outside Director Liability
The KCC imposes the same liability on inside and outside directors for
appropriation of corporate opportunities. This is questionable logic considering
there is a significant difference between directors who manage the company and
outside directors in terms of the accessibility to internal information and the
opportunity to divert property or resources of the company. Considering these
differences, corporate opportunity regulations applicable to outside directors
should be less stringent than those applicable to directors who manage the
company.81 In practice, ALI Principles of Corporate Governance in U.S. applies
the “line of business test” to CEOs and “interest or expectancy test” to outside
directors. There are also arguments in Korea that an outside director’s liability
should be restricted to the cases involving use of the company’s information or
assets closely related to current or future business.82
6. Defense on the Ground of Corporate Inability
As discussed above, in the U.S. a director or officer may take a corporate
opportunity without consulting the board on the grounds that the company is
unable to pursue the opportunity (usually for financial reasons). In any case,
78

Lee Cheolsong, Corporate Law 20th ed. (PYBooks. 2012), p. 730.

79

According to KCC Article 392-2, the board of directors may establish committees
composed of two or more directors, within the board, as prescribed by the articles of incorporation,
and allows the board of directors to delegate its power to the committees (other than as prohibited
by law).
80

Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 188~189.

81

Kim Hwa-Jin, op. cit., p.327.

82

Lee Yun Seok, “A Study on Appropriation of Corporate Opportunity”, YGBL Vol. 3(1).
(2011), pp. 147~148.
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where the corporation is not able to pursue an opportunity, wrongful appropriation
of the opportunity may not be established merely by the company merely by
virtue of the fact that it was taken by a director or officer. However according to
KCC Article 397-2, there is no explicit provision setting forth a defense based on
corporate inability. Generally, the reasons for corporate inability are financial
inability, legal inability (based on articles of association83 or law), or a refusal to
deal with the company by a potential counterparty. In Korea there is an ongoing
discussion over whether such a defense could be justified by KCC Article 397-2.84
In many situations it is difficult to determine objectively that a company
is unable to pursue an opportunity, and approval by the board of directors may be
needed in order to establish ability/ or inability. For example, in cases where (i)
there is short-term shortage in funds that are to be overcome by loans, (ii)
business objectives are limited by articles of association but could be resolved by
amendment of articles of association or (iii) there is a way to persuade a third
party or regulators to support the transaction, the inability may be overcome
through reasonable efforts of the company or the board and potential corporate
inability can be overcome. However when there is an objective inability that
cannot be overcome by action of the board, then such a situation should be
recognized as a ground for defense (but the burden of proof does lay with the
director). Not recognizing such defense would force directors to disclose
83
According to the Supreme Court of Korea, “Company’s capacity of enjoyment of rights
are limited to objects of laws that act as establishment basis for the company and company’s
articles of association, but an act in the area of company’s competence is not limited to the
competence stated in the articles of association, but includes direct, indirect necessary acts, and
when determining whether it is needed for performing its obligations, it will be judged according
to the act’s objective nature, not the performer’s subjective, specific will” (Supreme Court of
Korea, No. 86 Daka 1349, September 8, 1987).
84

According to Kim Hong-Ki, op. cit., pp. 117~118, corporate financial inability can be
established as a ground for defense, but according to Park Sun Jong, op. cit., p. 257, it cannot be
allowed that a ground for defense is established according to a director’s personal determination,
which is what financial ability is, not the determination of the board of directors. Meanwhile,
according to Bae Do, “A Study on the corporate opportunity doctrine”, Soongsil University Law
Review Vol. 21, (2009), p. 18, when a third party has provided opportunity to the director, but the
director refused to provide it to the corporation, then no corporate opportunity is established, on
the other hand, according to Kim Hong-Ki, op. cit., pp. 117~118, director’s ground for defense
cannot be allowed from legal inability or third party refusal to deal, since it is against the director’s
duty of loyalty, and according to Kim Jeongho, “Appropriation of corporate opportunity”,
Business Administration and Law Vol. 17(2) (2007), p. 167, Lee Yun Seok, op. cit., p. 100, even
corporate opportunity that is not allowed according to its laws or articles of association, these must
be provided to the corporation, and measures must be considered to amend its articles of
association or evade laws. Whereas according to Lee Cheolsong, op. cit., p. 732, since corporate
opportunity for approval is limited to existing, future corporate’s benefit, corporate’s inability
should be a judgment factor in determining whether benefit exists.
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unnecessary information (a business opportunity may be lost because of such
disclosure) and the corporation has to call an otherwise unnecessary meeting of
the board.85 As noted, the KCC approach to corporate inability is currently quite
different than the rule under U.S. law. While many aspects of the U.S. corporate
opportunity doctrine are imperfect, the safe harbor rule propagated by the Broz
and Texelon line of cases and discussed above is an efficient and practical way to
approach the sensitive matter of corporate inability. Allowing the director or
officer who is taking the opportunity to avoid formal presentment and a
discussion of corporate inability, while at the same time rewarding him for
undertaking such discussions when appropriate by protecting him from later
liability, properly incentivizes the parties to consider the issue but allows them to
avoid disclosing sensitive information and calling unnecessary meetings when
appropriate.
7. No Consideration of Conglomerates
Unlike the U.S.,86 Korea faces problems with appropriation of corporate
opportunities in conglomerate environments, not just with individual corporations.
The Delaware Supreme Court did deal with a similar issue in the 1956 case
Johnston v. Greene (discussed above), where a finding that the usurped
opportunity was a corporate one then necessitated a decision regarding which of a
number of corporations had the strongest right to the opportunity—a very
complex question for a court to decide. As discussed previously, KCC Article
397-2 was inserted so as to regulate appropriation of corporate opportunity inside
conglomerates. In Korea, many corporations operate under as part of a
conglomerate, and therefore it can be hard to determine whether a corporation’s
business opportunity could also be regarded as another affiliated corporation’s
business opportunity.
Such problems arise when a director of a corporation is also a director of
another corporation under the same conglomerate. However since the KCC
Article 397-2 also regulates appropriation of corporate opportunity for a third
party, such issues are not only limited to concurrent directorship. In order to solve
this issue, according to some scholars, the opportunity’s nature should be
evaluated. First, it should be considered whether the opportunity can be used
together by several corporations. When an opportunity can only be used by one
85

Kim Hwa-Jin, op. cit., p.327-328.

86

In U.S. cases, nearly all issues regarding appropriation of corporate opportunity are
about individual corporations. There are not many cases besides Sinclair Oil Corp v. Levien (280 A.
2d 717 (Del. 1971) where appropriation between affiliates of conglomerates was concerned (and
Johnston v. Greene (discussed above), which contained a different but somewhat analogous fact
pattern).
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corporation, then the opportunity should belong to the most appropriate company;
if the company chooses not to pursue the opportunity then it should pass to the
next appropriate company.87 This argument can only be applied when there is a
fixed standard to regulate how to allocate common business opportunities
between affiliates. In reality it is very hard to have such a standard.88
Especially in Korea, shareholders and corporations are treated as entirely
different personalities. The court has ruled internal transactions of wholly-owned
subsidiaries unfair as it did not recognize that the transactions of wholly-owned
subsidiaries create agency costs.89 While focusing on the need for regulation, the
legislation of KCC Article 397-2 overlooked the unique conglomerate situation in
Korea and left many unresolved issues caused by special considerations for
conglomerates.
VI.

HOW TO APPROACH FAVORITISM

A.

Was Tunneling Involved?

Favoring someone in a commercial transaction should not be per se
illegal. The freedom of contract protects our choice of counterparty. The trouble is
that corporate managers exercise their power to choose the counterparty. What if
the personal interest of the manager wrongly affects the choice? Even in such

87

Chun Gyeonghun, op. cit., p. 186. Cf. Terence Woolf, The Venture Capitalist’s
Corporate Opportunity Problem, 2001 Columbia Business Law Review 489, 496-497: “VCs
(Venture Capitalists) do not make investment in a single enterprise, but instead allocate resources
across a different number of companies.” So “If fiduciary duties were strictly enforced, VCs like
Apex would not be able to make investments in multiple ventures.” “If fiduciary duties do not
provide any ascertainable benefit to a company or its shareholders, but instead create negative
costs by preventing directors, officers and VC firms from investing their human and economic
capital in other ventures, logic would dictate that the imposition of such duties should be relaxed.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act provide a
means to address this misallocation, by allowing parties to waive their fiduciary duties through a
system of disclosure, negotiation and contract.”
88

Choi Munhui, “Appropriation of corporate opportunity in conglomerates”, BFL Vol. 19.
(2006), pp. 38~41, in theory, there are other standards of allocation discussed as follows; (i) a way
to calculate net present value of business opportunity of each company and give the opportunity to
the company with the highest value, (ii) give the opportunity to a subsidiary instead of a holding
company, when there is more than on subsidiary, then give the opportunity to the subsidiary with
the lowest holing company’s shares, (iii) allocate the opportunity proportional to the market value
of the company. Yet none of these standards provide complete standard in allocation.
89

Supreme Court of Korea, No. 2001 Du 7411, September 5, 2003.
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cases, if nobody in the company is worse off after the managerial decision, i.e., if
the price was fair, what is the problem?90
Let us revisit the Hyundai Motor Case. Hyundai Motor has been
outsourcing its distribution services since before the establishment of Hyundai
Glovis, and simply shifted existing outsourced business to a new provider
(Hyundai Glovis). The only difference for Hyundai Motor is that the other party
was previously a non-affiliate, and now the business is given to an affiliate, the
shareholders of which are CEO Chung Mongkoo, director of Hyundai Motor and
controlling shareholder of Hyundai Motor Group, and his son. Yet, is it really
important for Hyundai Motor who the other party to a transaction is and what
corporate governance the other party has? For Hyundai Motor only the business
terms of the relationship really matter. For example, let us assume that Apple Inc.
(“Apple”) decided to change its manufacturer/supplier for its product’s display
device from Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung Electronics”) to LG
Electronics Inc. (“LG Electronics”). What matters for Apple is which of Samsung
Electronics or LG Electronics is better capable of satisfying Apple’s
manufacturing/supply requirements. Arguably, it does not really matter who owns
Samsung Electronics or LG Electronics, whether it is Lee Geonhui or Koo Bonmu
(at least from the perspective of the corporation and its shareholders).
Then why did the shareholders of Hyundai Motor question the transaction
with Hyundai Glovis? Maybe the shareholders thought that Hyundai Motor’s
damage occurred since Hyundai Motor could have gained all the profits of
Hyundai Glovis through cost cutting, a share dividend or an increase in share
prices if Hyundai Motor established Hyundai Glovis as a wholly owned affiliate.
Yet such questions are unreasonable. According to theories of law and economics,
there are two ways to organize production and establish order between divisions
in the society; through a market or an organization such as a corporation. When
organizing through market, transaction costs are needed, and when organizing
through organizations, organization costs are needed.91 If a corporation, by itself
or through affiliates, internalizes any function, transaction costs would likely
decrease and organization costs increase. Organization costs depend on
corporation’s initial investment costs (including opportunity costs), risk of failure,
likely ability to continue its business, investment capability, financial situation,
ability to hire professionals, maintenance costs, goods and services quality

90

See Stephen Choi & Eric Talley, Playing Favorites with Shareholders, 75 Southern
California Law Review 271 (2002).
91

Oliver Eaton Williamson & Sidney G. Winter, The Nature of the Firm – Origins,
Evolution, and Development 18 et seq. (Oxford University Press, 1993).

31

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

31

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 79 [2013]

regarding each corporation’s situation. 92 If Hyundai Motor conducts its own
distribution or establishes Hyundai Glovis as a wholly owned affiliate, then it
could reduce its transaction costs, lessen the risk of not finding a competitive
price, and gain the direct profit from transacting distribution services. Yet it
should be noted that it also bears the risk of business failure, organization costs
and its maintenance costs. Therefore it is hard to conclude that Hyundai Motor
would have gained all the profits that Hyundai Glovis has gained. Furthermore, it
is impossible to calculate the profits of Hyundai Glovis as loss of profit (damages)
to the shareholders of Hyundai Motor.
Even if the decision not to internalize the distribution business was
appropriate and made by due process, why did the business have to be given to a
corporation established by controlling shareholders of Hyundai Motor Group? If
the outsourcing of distribution services itself was appropriate, then damages
wouldn’t have occurred by having it outsourced to a corporation established by
controlling shareholders of Hyundai Motor Group. On the other hand one could
expect transactions between Hyundai Motor and Hyundai Glovis not to be at
arm’s length and for one or the other to come out ahead; in fact the court
acknowledged that above-market freight charges caused damages equivalent to
KRW 14.3 billion to Hyundai Motor. There does appear to have been tunneling,93
at least to this extent. Yet such tunneling did not occur from outsourcing its
distribution services, but from unfairly high freight charges. Conflict of interest
issues arising from counterparty identity should be regulated by the KCC Article
398 (section regulating self-dealing transactions). If it is not in the realm of
Article 398,94 then it should be regulated by director’s duty of good manager’s
due care in determining the terms of a transaction.95
92

Transactions will be internalized to the extent the increased organizational cost does not
exceed transaction cost. The corporation will be extended to that level.
93

See generally, Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and
Tunneling, 37 Journal of Corporation Law 1 (2011). For a discussion of tunneling from a Korean
perspective, see Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by
Korean Business Groups, 57 Journal of Finance 2695 (2002).
94

As discussed above, the KCC Article 398 expanded who the other party of self-dealing
transaction is. Yet the transaction between Hyundai Glovis and Hyundai Motor is (like under the
former KCC) not regulated as a self-dealing transaction.
95
Meanwhile the KFTC, which imposed a penalty surcharge, raised questions that
Hyundai Motor had outsourced its distribution business to Hyundai Glovis, which as a new
established company, its business ability not even verified. However, Hyundai Glovis took over an
existing company, which has been entrusted with the distribution business by Hyundai Motor
before. Furthermore, since the court recognized in the Hyundai Motor Case that Hyundai Glovis
developed an integrated distribution system and increased effectiveness in the distribution system
of affiliates, it is hard to consider that any damages occurred to Hyundai Motor due to Hyundai
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B.

The Business Judgment Rule

In the end, the business judgment rule underlies our entire discussion.96
In the Hyundai Motor Case, whether to internalize Hyundai Motor’s distribution
service or outsource it is a matter of directors’ duty of good manager’s due care
by comparing transaction cost and organization cost (a matter of the business
judgment). The same applies to who the other party should be when outsourcing
distribution service and under what conditions it should be outsourced. The court
ruled on the issue as follows: “Hyundai Glovis’s distribution services are in fact,
an assistance service for Hyundai Motor Group’s manufacture and sales, however
an automobile company does not have to directly conduct its distribution services
or establish a subsidiary for its service on grounds that distribution services are
related to or contingent upon automobile businesses. Whether to outsource its
business is not depended upon relevance to or contingency upon the company’s
business, rather it is determined according to business judgment. Thus, whether to
establish an internal business unit, establish a subsidiary or outsource it to another
company for already outsourced the distribution serves, is fundamentally at the
discretion of the company’s business judgment.” IThe court recognized that the
decision to outsource was legal according to the business judgment rule, but held
that increased freight charges for Hyundai Glovis could not be legitimized as
business judgment.
Although “Funneling of Business” such as that occurring in the Hyundai
Motor Case is not an appropriation of a corporate opportunity, it is also a matter
of business judgment. If the information on the corporate opportunity is fully
disclosed, and the board of directors judged through careful reasonable due
process that it is for the benefit of the corporation not to use such opportunity,
then such decision should be protected by the business judgment rule.
VII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This Article reviewed the controversial corporate opportunity doctrine as
it was discussed and promulgated as law in Korea and analyzed the doctrine in the
context of the Hyundai Motor Case. One cannot question that the corporate
opportunity doctrine has a certain legitimacy and useful function as a wellGlovis’s lack of ability.
96

In Korea the business judgment rule is generally accepted as follows. “Although
damages to the company have occurred by resolution of directors, if such a resolution had
sufficient grounds and was determined by careful and reasonable due process, then directors do
not have liability to compensate.” Cf. Hwa-Jin Kim, Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Corporate
Control and Restructuring Transactions: Recent Developments in Korea, 2006 Oxford University
Comparative Law Forum 2 http://ouclf. iuscomp.org/articles/kim.shtml.
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founded iteration of the director’s duty of loyalty. However the incorporation of
the corporate opportunity doctrine into the KCC may have been premature, as the
debate surrounding the concept and the legal nature of duty of loyalty is not yet
settled sufficiently. The corporate opportunity doctrine is derived from U.S. case
law (still a somewhat abstract concept there) and takes on different elements and
analysis framework as the fact patters change; it is nearly impossible to establish a
workable and flexible doctrine in a few codified provisions. Moreover, the
corporate opportunity doctrine was promulgated as law in Korea to regulate the
so-called “Funneling of Business”; a concept that lies quite outside the corporate
opportunity doctrine’s focus, application framework and body of precedent in the
US. This makes the development of the KCC Article 397-2 in Korea even more
difficult (and calls for an approach that is unique from that in the U.S., and more
tailored to the Korean business environment). On these bases, we conclude that
the corporate opportunity doctrine of Korea needs substantial refinement before it
can become a workable solution to the specific problems facing Korean corporate
law today.
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